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 Justifiability of Taxation in Universal 
Provision of Healthcare1 
 
TOMÁŠ VÁŇA 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 In this paper2 I aim to provide one possible way of defending taxation. I 
will do so by refuting Nozick’s defence of private property and inviolable rights 
showing that there is no absolute entitlement to private property. I will then 
rebut Cohen’s rejection of private property embodying theft and, at the same 
time, his advocacy of common ownership. Also, I will show that while private 
property can’t be inviolable, the benefits it brings provide a strong argument for 
its defence. I will further pursue a communitarian approach advocating priority 
of the society over an individual and reject a purely individualistic approach to a 
person. On the basis of these two assumptions I will proceed with claiming that 
taxation is justifiable as a means of providing public goods which are to the 
common good of all polity members. 
In the second section, I will outline the benefits of private property and 
pursue the idea that since taxation benefits all members of a polity, it is 
unreasonable for someone to claim that he doesn’t intend to benefit from the 
joint enterprise of life in a society. Therefore, inspired by the fair play theory, I 
aim to show that taxation is justifiable and coercion to pay taxes is acceptable. 
In the following section I will apply the problem of taxation to the area 
of healthcare, addressing common intuitions and approaches justifying universal 
provision of healthcare. I will recognise the rights approach as well as the one 
departing from a refusal of disadvantage and equality as economically 
problematic, and hence demonstrate that a difference principle based on making 
the worse off as best off as possible presents a plausible approach of defending 
universal provision of healthcare. Moreover, I will argue that due to the fact that 
universal provision of healthcare is to the benefit of all and of the society as a 
whole, providing it through taxation is acceptable and desirable. I will then 
                                                 
1
  This paper was created with the Institutional Support of UK, FSV, IPS (Charles 
University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Politological Studies). 
2
  This study was supported by the Charles University Research Development Schemes, 
programme P17 - Sciences of Society, Politics, and Media under the Challenge of the 
Times at UK, FSV, IPS. 
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briefly address the extent to which healthcare should be provided and advocate 
the view that it can’t be determined by a fixed list of services but adapted to the 
particular circumstances of every society. 
In the concluding section I will address some key problems that 
universal provision of healthcare presents from an economical perspective and 
pursue the view that while regulation and redistribution are necessary, they must 
be kept to the lowest level in order to preserve the advantages of capitalism as 
well as of universal provision of healthcare 
 
 
 Implausibility of Inviolable Rights to Private Property 
 
I will start by criticising the libertarian defence of private property and 
inviolable rights. By showing the implausibility of the libertarian approach I 
aim to demonstrate that taxation is justifiable. I will contrast the libertarian 
approach to Cohen’s ‒ condemning private property as theft ‒ and show why 
his view is not plausible either and illustrate that private property can be 
defended on the basis of its indispensability for human flourishing. I will thus 
show that an unconditional approach to private property is unreasonable and 
that it needs to be viewed from a more utilitarian perspective. 
Nozick’s self-ownership thesis, on which he bases his understanding of 
rights3, requires an individual to be self-sufficient. I make this claim because we 
can’t say that we fully own our bodies if we aren’t able to preserve them 
without external aid. But Nozick’s historical approach to rights4 makes the self-
ownership thesis implausible due to the problem of infinite regress. For us to be 
able to own ourselves, we need to be born. We also need to have the resources 
vital for survival at our disposal. Similarly, those who provide these resources 
and enable our birth, in their turn, needed to be supplied with corresponding 
resources and be given birth. This regressing line goes back to the first human 
couple. As is evident, the creation and continuance of our life depended on the 
acquisition of resources indispensable for life. Because Nozick considers 
material goods to be initially unowned5 and appropriated at some historical 
point6, to defend the claim of self-ownership he needs to justify their initial 
acquisition. Two problems follow from this argument: one is that humans 
couldn’t have had possessions before they started to exist, but they still needed 
something to come into existence. This is a problem Nozick doesn’t deal with. 
                                                 
3
  J. Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1991, pp.139-140. 
4
  T.R. De Gregori, “Market Morality: Robert Nozick and the Question of Economic 
Justice”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 38, no. 1, 1979, p. 20. 
5
  J. Wolff, Robert Nozick…cit., pp.104-105. 
6
  R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, p. 150. 
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The second problem which Nozick deals with but fails to solve is that of just 
acquisition of material goods. 
In what follows I will show why his defence of just initial acquisition 
fails. From this argumentation I will conclude that not only does Nozick not 
succeed in showing how we can be entitled to private property but also the fact 
that because of this failure his claim of self-ownership, and consequently his 
defence of individual inviolable rights, fails7. 
Nozick departs from Locke’s argument that we can appropriate 
something unowned by mixing our labour with it8. Why such an action would 
make it ours, nevertheless, remains unclear and Nozick is aware of this 
difficulty9. There is no clear argument why mixing our labour with something 
wouldn’t end in our losing our labour to the benefit of the thing we mixed it 
with. Another difficulty Nozick raises deals with the boundaries of 
appropriation. Why would James Cook’s sight of Australia make it his (or his 
monarch’s) is unclear as is the claim that by planting a tree on the beach at its 
east coast, the west coast could be justly appropriated as well. 
Nozick further considers the possibility that by saying “hath mixed his 
labour with”10, Locke meant improving the appropriated possession. But 
appropriation necessarily has to take place before improving the material good. 
Moreover, there is no certainty that improvement will take place after 
appropriation, either because of our inability, temporality of the improvement, 
or unimprovability of some goods. Furthermore it’s unclear why improving 
would entitle us to appropriation11. If it did, by improving something we could 
appropriate anything unowned, which is not only implausible (imagine 
appropriating a part of the universe by illuminating it with a light beam from 
Earth), but would also violate the liberty of others and possibly make them 
worse off, although materially speaking, they might be better off12. 
Unfortunately, although Nozick is aware of the limits of Locke’s 
approach, he doesn’t present an alternative defence of just acquisition of 
property. He attempts to modify the Lockean proviso by claiming that 
acquisition is just if it doesn’t make anyone worse off than he was before this 
acquisition, but as I previously pointed out, he doesn’t satisfactorily deal with 
the problem of baselines, so it is difficult to determine what making someone 
                                                 
7
  But even if Nozick succeeded in his defence of just acquisition, the problem of infinite 
regress would still remain unresolved. 
8
  J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2003, pp. 111-112. 
9
  R. Nozick, Anarchy…cit., p. 174. 
10
  J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government…cit., p. 111. 
11
  R. Nozick, Anarchy…cit., pp. 175-176. 
12
  I will elaborate on this later in the paper. 
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worse off means13. Rather than comparing the situation after appropriation to 
the situation prior to it, we should compare it to the best possible appropriating 
option. An American adopting a Somali orphan makes it better off as long as 
this doesn’t prevent it from being adopted by Bill Gates, at least if we 
understand being well off in terms of material well-being. Understanding being 
worse off only in terms of material well-being is another problem in Nozick’s 
argumentation14, as he assumes that material welfare has priority over other 
values, like liberty. But experience15 shows us that a number of people prefer 
being poor and independent rather than rich and dependent, or prefer other 
values to material well-being. Also, assuming that being worse off is possible 
only in a purely material manner would enable material compensation, which 
would result in unreasonable fear and uncertainty16. Furthermore, there are 
things that can’t be compensated with material goods. 
Lastly, Nozick’s proviso doesn’t deal with future situations. 
Appropriating something in the present without leaving someone worse off 
doesn’t guarantee that it will not leave someone worse off in the future17 18. 
Apparently, Nozick doesn’t satisfactorily defend a just initial 
acquisition of private property19 and thus fails to defend private property as well 
as self-ownership and, as a consequence, inviolable rights. But there is another 
aspect in the way Nozick understands rights, which is the critique I wish to 
pursue at this moment. Cohen pointed out that Nozick’s understanding of rights 
is not consistent, because private property limits liberty by preventing others 
from owning it as well as by limiting their possibilities20 21, which means a 
collision of rights – something that Nozick doesn’t accept. According to 
Cohen’s negative understanding of liberty, any interference with our actions 
must be understood as a restriction on our freedom22. The implausibility of such 
                                                 
13
  Rawls encountered an analogical problem (J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 83). 
14
  S. Hailwood, Exploring Nozick: Beyond Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Avebury, Sydney, 
1996, p. 43. 
15
  A woman preferring to marry a poor man she loves to a wealthy man she despises. 
16
  A.R. Lacey, Robert Nozick, Acumen, Chesham, 2011, pp. 43-44. 
17
  Selling Alaska to the USA seemed beneficial for Russia until gold, oil and other natural 
resources were discovered on its territory. 
18
  L. Wenar, “Original Acquisition of Private Property”, Mind, vol. 107, no. 428, 1998, 
p. 810. 
19
  Consequently his two other principles of just transfer and rectification of past injustices 
fall as well. 
20
  If I appropriate the only road leading from point A to point B I constrain the possibilities 
of others to commute between these two points if I don’t permit them to use this road. 
21
  G.A. Cohen, “Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat”, in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pp.166-168. 
22
 G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1995, pp. 59-60. 
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approach was recognised by Wenar who reckons that it leads to unreasonable 
claims such as that an “exasperated mother of two screaming infants is free to 
[...] strangle them in their cribs”23. Nozick doesn’t share Cohen’s radical 
approach as he accepts constraints on our actions in the form of rights, therefore 
our entitlement to private property can’t limit the liberty of others24. But if I 
stand on a piece of land I own and someone else owns all the land around it, 
isn’t the impossibility of me leaving my piece of land a restriction on my 
freedom? And wouldn’t my leaving this piece of land through stepping on the 
land owned by someone else be a violation of its owner’s property rights? 
Nozick’s position seems implausible in this point. Since Nozick doesn’t show 
how we can justly acquire property, with his conception of rights it is 
impossible to show to what extent private property can serve as a side constraint 
in relation to other rights, including liberty. 
But Cohen’s advocacy of the opposing view of common ownership25 
fails to enhance liberty as well. When two people own something commonly, it 
doesn’t extend their opportunity of using the material good, because neither of 
them can use all of this commune property at the same time. 
Furthermore, if person A owns a dozen apples and person B owns a 
dozen pears, if they decide on common ownership and are to be fair, both of 
them will get a dozen fruits. But there is no reason to believe that the same 
transaction couldn’t take place voluntarily without common ownership. In 
addition, this arrangement assumes that each has the same amount of material 
goods. But if person A had a dozen watermelons and person B a dozen grape 
balls, person A would certainly be worse off if common ownership was 
instituted. Arguably, in the sum no one would lose out, because person B would 
be correspondingly better off, but building defence of liberty on these grounds 
is inadequate. 
However, Cohen’s advocacy of common ownership and rejection of 
private property are not based on the limit to liberty it entails, but on its 
injustice26. Because he sees all property as proceeding from land ‒ which at 
some point wasn’t owned by anyone ‒ he concludes that someone had to 
appropriate it at some point. Since no one is entitled to such appropriation, 
Cohen qualifies such appropriation as theft27. But Locke, on the other hand, 
showed the implausibility of such an approach, because we would all die of 
                                                 
23
 L. Wenar, “The Meanings of Freedom”, in L. Thomas (ed.), Contemporary Debates in 
Social Philosophy, Blackwell Publishing, United Kingdom, 2008, p. 47. 
24
 J. Wolff, Robert Nozick…cit., p. 94. 
25
 G.A. Cohen, “Capitalism…cit.”, pp.169-170. 
26
 Ibidem, p.165. 
27
  G.A. Cohen, History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1988, pp. 301-302. 
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hunger if that was the case28. To derive from initial common ownership that it 
endures as a permanent state, simply means to stop halfway in reasoning. 
In this section, I demonstrated  that a libertarian defence of an 
individual’s inviolable rights, including the right to private property, lacks 
plausible grounds. But although Nozick fails to defend just initial acquisition 
whereas Cohen considers such acquisition, and thus all private property, unjust 
and as theft, I will argue that private property can be defended on the basis of its 
contribution to human flourishing. What my argumentation so far shows is that 
in some cases, private property can be taken from an individual without 
inflicting injustice. 
 
 
Implausibility of Individualism and Autonomy 
 
I will now argue that an individualistic understanding of a person isn’t 
plausible and claim that there are necessary and ineradicable ties between 
individuals on the one hand, and between them and a polity, on the other. I will 
expand my earlier critique of Nozick’s prioritisation of individual rights by 
refuting the advocacy of the priority of autonomy in the understanding of R.P. 
Wolff and consequently demonstrating an individual’s need of a community. I 
will also advocate Taylor’s prioritisation of the society before individual’s 
rights29. On the basis of the presented arguments, as well as those in the 
preceding section, I will conclude that because society has priority over 
individual’s rights, they are not inviolable and thus taxation is under certain 
circumstances justifiable. 
Wolff claims that an autonomous individual has to be able to make 
decisions and act in accordance with them as well as accept responsibility for 
these decisions30. But Wolff’s simultaneous rejection of any external influence 
in the decision-making process and his requirement for an individual to act 
solely upon his own judgment are implausible for their incommensurateness, as 
many decisions can’t be made by an individual on his own. Because one’s own 
decisions may violate his autonomy, it is often reasonable to accept the 
judgment of others. While Wolff would consider that a loss of autonomy, 
Frankfurt considered such an understanding of it to be unreasonable31, because 
when an individual lacks expertise in a specific field, it is rational for him to 
                                                 
28
  J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government…cit., p. 112. 
29
  This nevertheless doesn’t deny the existence of individual’s rights. 
30
  R.P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, University of California Press, Berkeley; London, 
1998, pp. 12-13. 
31
  H.G. Frankfurt, “The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff”, Political Theory, vol. 1, no. 4, 
1973, pp. 412-413. 
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surrender his judgment to an expert32. If a doctor prescribes him medicine, it is 
rational for him to use it. 
A further reason why Wolff’s conception of autonomy is not consistent 
is that many of our decisions are definite and thus limit our possible future 
judgment33. But not making them would prevent us from performing actions 
necessary for our lives like signing business contracts, marrying, or taking 
loans. As Green remarked:  
 
“To the extent that it [autonomy] excludes all forms of binding commitment 
[...] it is without value and takes on the guise of purely abstract freedom [...], [while] 
autonomy as a human ideal [...] requires the capacity to commit oneself to certain 
courses of action”34. 
 
Moreover, to coexist with other members of the society, it is sometimes 
necessary to surrender our autonomy by accepting rules. To decide that we will 
print our own money and pay with them in a supermarket would endanger not 
only our civil liberty (because of punishment for counterfeiting), but also our 
life (because of lack of resources to acquire means for survival), which is the 
ultimate limit to our autonomy35. 
I have shown that Wolff's advocacy of autonomy, closely related to 
individualism, doesn’t offer a reasonable understanding of an individual and his 
actions, as well as that his extensive priority given to autonomy, as if it could 
override any other value, is not plausible. The key difficulty with Wolff’s 
approach is that he understands a polity as an individual’s tool for gaining 
benefits rather than a community in the understanding of Tönnies’s 
“gemeinschaft”36. A similar approach is advanced by Nozick in his thesis of 
self-ownership and of inalienable rights but he doesn’t go as far as Wolff by 
advocating anarchy, which denies that there are any moral ties between 
members of a polity and the polity itself. While anarchists oppose the state on 
the basis that by exercising its power over individuals it violates their rights, 
Nozick not only claims that anarchy is not a plausible concept and that a state 
always proceeds from it, but also that the violation of rights is not an inevitable 
part of this process37. 
                                                 
32
  Wolff’s attempt to consider such judgments to be in fact our own by adopting them is a 
deceiving thought exercise because when we lack expertise we make a decision to accept 
the judgment of the other, not the judgment itself. 
33
  If we marry, we definitely abandon our bachelor status. 
34
  L. Green, The Authority of the State, Clarendon, Oxford 1988, pp. 35-36. 
35
  Another classical example is obeying the Highway Code. 
36
  F. Tönnies, Community and Association: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London, 1955. 
37
  R. Nozick, Anarchy…cit., p. xi. 
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The high value asserted to autonomy was refused by Taylor who based 
his critique on the claim that men aren’t able to develop their capacities outside 
the society38 because attainment of an identity requires a certain conception of 
oneself, which can’t be attained on one’s own, but through recognition in the 
society39. A correlated view was advocated by Aristotle in his claim that man is 
“zoon politikon” who needs to live in “polis” to develop his human capacities40. 
Following Taylor’s argumentation in his essay on atomism41, the primacy of 
individual rights has no ground. If individuals can only develop their capacities 
in a society, it would be unreasonable to deny its significance as well as their 
obligation to preserve and support it. Taylor persuasively showed that “asserting 
rights itself involves acknowledging an obligation to belong”42. Society thus 
necessarily has to have priority over the individual and his rights because he 
wouldn’t be able to claim his rights without it. Moreover, to prioritise individual 
rights would entail that an individual would not only be enabled to violate rights 
of other individuals in a society, but also to destroy rights. The priority of 
individual rights would thus fall to inconsistency. 
Notions regarding mutual influence between individuals and the natural 
character of the bond connecting them need to be mentioned at this point. The 
latter can be demonstrated by considering its negation43 advocated by most 
contractual theories44. If there was no natural bond or ethical relationship 
between individuals and duties, and if relations among them were based solely 
on consent, no ties would remain when the benefits of such relations 
disappeared45. We can witness the implausibility of such an approach in our 
everyday lives when individuals don’t care for each other just because they 
agreed to do so. Friendships, family ties, and other social relationships are a 
sound proof to that. 
The second consideration is the mutual influence between individuals. 
One’s abuse of drugs not only influences his personal well-being but also that of 
his peers, the atmosphere in the neighbourhood, public health, criminality, etc. 
The interdependence of individuals is one reason why we consider the 
punishment of certain acts harming others to be justifiable. The other is the 
protection of the violators of its rules, because by harming the society the 
                                                 
38
  Taylor’s approach requires a confirmation of this assumption which I supplied by 
outlining the problem of infinite regress in my critique of Nozick’s self-ownership thesis. 
39
  Ch. Taylor, “Atomism”, in Idem (ed.), Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 209. 
40
  Aristotle, The Politics, Penguin Group, London, 1992, p. 59. 
41
  Ch. Taylor, “Atomism”, cit., pp. 187-211. 
42
  Ibidem, p. 200. 
43
  Artificial bond. 
44
  J. Horton, Political Obligation, The Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1992. 
45
  T.M. Brewer, “Two Kinds of Commitment (And Two Kinds of Social Groups)”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 66, no. 3, 2003, p. 569. 
Justifiability of Taxation 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 4  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
677
violator harms himself as well, because although he might not recognise it, 
living in the community is beneficial for him. This point will prove important in 
my later argumentation favouring universal provision of healthcare. 
 
 
Advocacy of Private Property 
 
In the preceding sections I have argued two main points: (1) there is no 
inviolable right to private property and (2) the society has a priority over 
individual rights. I have no intention of refuting individual rights, not to 
mention the right to private property. I see it as incontestable that individuals 
have more entitlement to the fruits of their labour than those who haven’t 
laboured. Similarly, I see it as incontestable that the extent to which society has 
priority over the individual has its limits, and the rights of individuals mustn’t 
be violated. A society can’t sacrifice lives of innocents to enhance its well-
being. 
The points indicated above, nevertheless, provide the basis for my 
argument that the right to private property is not absolute and under concrete 
circumstances can be overridden. However, it is essential to be cautious when 
stating these circumstances because, as I will show in this following section, the 
institution of private property substantially contributes to human flourishing. 
In every society there is a notion of someone having something that 
another member of the society can’t take without expecting justifiable 
consequences. Be it a bow and arrows, a wife or a piece of land. Hume 
attributes this to the scarcity of goods and limits of human benevolence46. In a 
society of permanent abundance, private property and redistribution wouldn’t 
exist47. If the world was divided into two flourishing islands, with one 
inhabitant on each of them and unaware of the other, the concept of private 
property wouldn’t exist, because there would be no threat to the well-being of 
the two. But the moment they would become aware of the other and the 
proximity of a potential loss of their abundance would become more real, be it 
the fear that the other could take away their well-being in case that he starts to 
lack something, or any other fear, the concept of private property would 
emerge. That is the present case. Because there are indisputable shortages of 
resources as well as fear of future shortages, private property is a social reality 
we created for the preservation of our well-being. 
                                                 
46
  D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1896, pp. 487-488. 
47
  We can easily demonstrate the outlined claim through the example of inexhaustible 
goods, like sunlight. As long as we have unrestricted access to it, we don’t feel the need of 
appropriating it. But the moment it becomes scarce and our access to it is restricted, for 
example because we are in a prison cell with ten other prisoners and we have to take turns 
in looking out a single window, it becomes an object of privation. 
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Private property as a reaction to the scarcity of goods and people’s fear 
brings the benefit of certainty that what belongs to one stays at his disposal and 
this certainty provides incentives to work and innovate. It also enables people to 
secure their future and thus provides the necessary incentives for people to 
pursue long-term goals. That is beneficial for the society because it makes 
people care about its preservation as it protects the rule of law, which 
guarantees the institution of private property. Moreover, due to the incentives to 
work and innovate, overall wealth is increased thanks to economic progress that 
is to the benefit of all48. 
In the Wealth of Nations49 Smith showed that wealth to a large extent 
proceeds from free operations on the market which depend on the existence of 
private property and that this “mixed free enterprise system [...] with all its 
faults has given the world a century of progress”50. That said, while throughout 
history poverty, rather than wealth, used to be the standard, today the level of 
poverty is rapidly decreasing and we are richer than we have ever been51 52. 
But, as I have shown, there are obvious limits to private property. 
Absolute private property isn’t plausible not only because of the entitlement 
difficulties, but also because of our obligations towards future generations. Its 
absoluteness would justify impune destruction. We see such an approach as 
undesirable not only from an ethical, but also from a legal point of view. That’s 
one of the reasons why we can’t tear down our renaissance palace or burn our 
money without expecting punishment. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
  Even though it may not be apparent that everyone benefits from the increased wealth of 
someone else, it is clear that higher profits of our neighbour lead to a higher payment of 
taxes, which are redistributed for the benefit of others; technological innovations of our 
neighbours company enable us to buy new goods; agronomical innovations of our 
neighbours company enable a faster and more plentiful growth of crops and this lead to 
lower taxes of wheat, etc. 
49
  A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Barnes & Noble Books, New York, 2004. 
50
  P. Samuelson, Economics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1948, p. 604. 
51
  GAPMINDER WORLD, Wealth & Health of Nations [online], Available at: 
<http://www.gapminder.org/world/#$majorMode=chart$is;shi=t;ly=2003;lb=f;il=t;fs=11;
al=30;stl=t;st=t;nsl=t;se=t$wst;tts=C$ts;sp=5.59290322580644;ti=2011$zpv;v=1$inc_x;
mmid=XCOORDS;iid=phAwcNAVuyj1jiMAkmq1iMg;by=ind$inc_y;mmid=YCOORD
S;iid=phAwcNAVuyj2tPLxKvvnNPA;by=ind$inc_s;uniValue=8.21;iid=phAwcNAVuyj0
XOoBL_n5tAQ;by=ind$inc_c;uniValue=255;gid=CATID0;by=grp$map_x;scale=log;dat
aMin=282;dataMax=119849$map_y;scale=lin;dataMin=12;dataMax=83$map_s;sma=49;
smi=2.65$cd;bd=0$inds=;example=75>. 
52
 As an illustration, we can consider the question how many people could afford to go on 
holiday even a few decades ago, while today a summer holiday in an exotic country 
doesn’t surprise anyone. 
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Justification of Taxation 
 
Having showed the beneficence of private property, I will now show the 
relation between private property and our obligation towards other individuals 
in the society. From this I will conclude that taxation is justifiable. 
We are able to generate wealth thanks to other people53. We can trade 
because there are individuals around us who we can trade with, who we can 
employ, whose minds we can use for innovation, who ensure the enforcement of 
law and thus create an economically favourable environment, etc. All these and 
many more goods proceeding from the society enable us to produce wealth and 
thus we owe it partly to others. Another already mentioned reason is that the 
resources we use are not ours in an absolute entitled sense. If we were entitled 
to our property and there were no ties between us and others, no moral 
obligation between us and them would exist. But as I have shown, that is not the 
case. Because of this and the arguments regarding private property and 
individualism I presented above, I conclude that taxation and consequent 
redistribution is under certain circumstances justifiable. This obviously has its 
limits, because, as Cohen remarks,  
 
“one might think that there is a strong moral obligation on healthy adults to donate 
blood in an emergency, when life is at stake, yet, in full consistency with that belief, 
regard as abominable a law requiring them to donate their blood, even if, without such a 
law, much avoidable death will occur”54. 
 
Taxation must be severely limited because of the inefficiency and loss 
of incentives it brings due to its property-taking nature. Here I propose a simple 
principle: taxation must be to the common good of the society and beneficial for 
everyone. Since everyone has the duty to pay taxes55, everyone should benefit 
from their redistribution. It would be a violation of justice, if resources allocated 
from everyone were beneficial only for a particular group, be it oligarchs 
controlling the state, an ethnic minority, the disadvantaged, a corporation, or 
any other. 
                                                 
53
  I hesitate to claim that we can only generate it thanks to other people, because if we were 
the only person on Earth, or there were very few people, or a child was abandoned in the 
wilderness and grew up unaware of the outside world, arguably he or they could generate 
wealth as well. 
54
  G.A. Cohen, History…cit., p. 299. 
55
  I take this as a general principle, not taking into account special cases when some are 
exempt from paying taxes. But even then consumption tax is paid when one buys goods 
and services within a given polity. 
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It is nevertheless important to understand that benefits don’t necessarily 
take the form of material goods. I will outline this statement by engaging with 
the fair play theory56. 
The fair play theory implies that as long as someone doesn’t want to 
benefit from a joint enterprise scheme, he shouldn’t be forced to carry its 
costs57. It can thus be argued that although the state and its institutions need 
resources for their survival and supply of public goods58, if someone doesn’t 
intend to receive them but nevertheless does, he shouldn’t be forced to carry 
their costs. Nozick’s convincing public address system example shows a line of 
argumentation that is difficult to tackle59, for if an individual hasn’t agreed with 
his participation in the enterprise, arguably he doesn’t consider his participation 
in it to be more beneficial for him than his non-participation, and it is hence 
unclear why he should carry its costs. 
In the case of provision of public goods I nevertheless claim that if they 
are reasonable60, it’s not plausible to believe that someone doesn’t intend to 
benefit from them and thus he should pay taxes otherwise he is free-riding61. It 
is true that if an individual wants to opt-out of the society, doesn’t intend to 
benefit from it in any way and, according to the fair-play theory, justifiably 
doesn’t want to carry its costs, it is difficult for him to do so. However, the 
benefits an individual receives by living in a society are so vast that I consider it 
highly unlikely that someone would want to reject it with full information of 
what such an action would incur62. To support my case, I need to defend two 
points: how can paying taxes be beneficial for everyone and why do people 
hesitate to pay them, if it is beneficial. I will start with claiming that paying 
taxes is beneficial for everyone. 
There are a number of activities which an individual ‒ either alone or 
with others ‒ performs and which others benefit from while he doesn’t consider 
them to be free-riding and hence doesn’t expect them to carry his costs. If he 
                                                 
56
  I am aware of the difficulties the fair play theory presents as well as of its individualistic 
nature. I nevertheless consider its application as a useful tool to demonstrate that taxation 
can be justified through bringing benefits to all. 
57
  H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, The Philosophical Review Theory, vol. 
64, no. 2, 1955, p. 185. 
58
  A characteristic of public goods is that an individual cannot be left out of them. 
59
  R. Nozick, Anarchy…cit., p. 93. 
60
  In a successive section I will outline why universal provision of healthcare as a public 
good is reasonable. 
61
  Nevertheless I admit that because it is impossible to recognise an individual’s intention, as 
we can only estimate it on the basis of his external actions, such free-riding is difficult to 
prove and hence everyone who fails to pay taxes is ordinarily prosecuted. 
62
  I don’t want to imply an impossibility of such a case but nonetheless it would be minor 
case and at this point I will not deal with it. It is worth reminding at this point the earlier 
argument of implausibility of self-sufficiency, although once one reaches adulthood it is 
more difficult to defend. 
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washes his windows and thus makes the neighbourhood more pleasant, provides 
a technological innovation in his company and thus reduces the cost of a 
product, enhances the local economy by setting up a business, employs 
someone and thus reduces costs of unemployment, others benefit from his 
activity but, nonetheless are not expected to carry his costs. To benefit from 
each other’s activities is a normal way of conduct in a community. Sometimes 
the benefits are so unclear that we can sympathise with the Nozickian claim that 
taxes are forced labour because we are forced to work for someone else63. But 
we can also think of this taxation as a way of sending money to a mentally 
retarded person who would die without our help. Or to a villain who would 
otherwise cause an uprising. Or as a form of insurance in case we get into a 
disadvantaged position in the future. In the area of universal provision of 
healthcare we are paying for the healthcare of an individual who, due to the 
received care, won’t have to receive social benefits as his untreated illness 
won’t prevent him from working, won’t die on the street and endanger us with 
illnesses, won’t engage in criminal activities because his health condition won’t 
prevent him from securing a respectable job, etc. 
Karsten advances an analogical argument when she notes that  
 
“providing for universal financial access to medical care is essential for equal 
opportunities, for greater productivity and competitiveness, for business profits, for a 
prosperous middle class, and for social peace and harmony”64 and “employment and 
well-paying jobs which can only be had by productive and competitive workers, are 
essential for domestic peace and tranquillity. Having a job means to be an active partner 
in the socioeconomic process and bestows on the employed man or woman a sense of 
dignity and inner peace. If society sees it as too expensive to take measures to enact 
universal health insurance [...] it will end up paying much more in reduced productivity 
and competitiveness, lower consumer demand, and in greater social conflict”65. 
 
As I will show in a successive part of this paper, the universal provision 
of healthcare requires enforcement of solidarity. It means that someone will pay 
more than he takes out of the system. It requires forcing those who are able to 
pay for healthcare to pay for those who aren’t able to do so. Moreover it forces 
those who wouldn’t under normal circumstances pay for healthcare, to pay for it 
for the sake of those, who aren’t able to pay for it. To put it simply, the old and 
the ill need the solidarity of the young and healthy, and to ensure this solidarity, 
the state must thus coerce the young and healthy to provide for the old and the 
ill. While Karsten’s and my consequent words reason in the area of healthcare, 
                                                 
63
  R. Nozick, Anarchy…cit., p.169. 
64
  S.G. Karsten, “Health Care: Private Good vs. Public Good”, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, vol. 54, no. 2, 1995, p. 133. 
65
  Ibidem, p. 141. 
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my present claim is more general and applies to taxation as a whole, as long as 
resources gathered through taxation are spent on reasonable issues. 
To address the question of why people do not want to pay taxes and 
hence have to be forced to do so, I find very helpful Hume’s insight claiming 
that individuals at times act under emotions and prioritise short-term benefits. 
Therefore, they have to be coerced to prioritise long-term benefits, like 
sacrificing buying a new yacht for the sake of paying a life’s insurance for one’s 
children66. Thus to pay taxes, and in that way to ensure that there will be less 
poverty and less risk of public uprisings, is more beneficial for the individual 
than buying a new yacht. 
A compatible reason why to coerce someone to pay taxes is free-riding, 
which is intrinsically wrong, because such an action not only signifies that an 
individual is using others as means, but also that he fails to respect the 
beneficial nature of the joint enterprise. 
I admit that the fair play theory applied in this way does present a 
problem because many individuals are coerced to paying taxes without prior 
consent. Nonetheless, I believe that my argument of beneficence which no one 
would reasonably reject can make use of the concept of hypothetical consent, 
although I am aware of the difficulties it presents67. That is given that the previously 
stated criterion that everyone needs to benefit from the enterprise is met. 
I have shown that due to the fact that we are not able to defend absolute 
rights to property, it can sometimes be taken away from us68. I concluded from 
this that for specific reasons property held by people can be redistributed for the 
well-being of the society, and as long as taxation takes place for the common 
good and for the benefit of all, it is justifiable and can’t be called theft. I have 
also shown that society is necessary for the existence of an individual, that the 
conclusion of the inevitability of anarchy drawn from prioritisation of autonomy 
is flawed, and thus some form of authority is necessary. I consider the state to 
be such an authority69. 
In the following section I will address the question whether taxation can 
be used to supply healthcare, that is if we can say that universal provision of 
healthcare would be to the benefit of all. 
 
 
 
                                                 
66
  D. Hume, A Treatise…cit., pp. 534-536. 
67
  J. Horton, Political Obligation, The Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1992, p. 83. 
68
  Experience shows that we do accept that, for example in martial law. 
69
  If property is common a reasonable question on the authority of a state can be raised as 
property is not limited to the state. Advocacy of one central authority, a global state, could 
be reasonable. But at this point I will assume that a state possesses the legitimacy to tax 
and redistribute. 
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Universal Provision of Healthcare 
 
Firstly, I will address the rights approach, which has become a principal 
fount of argumentation for universal provision of healthcare, and, secondly, an 
argument drawing on equality and disadvantage. 
I claim that the rights approach doesn’t offer an irrefutable account of 
why a state should provide healthcare. A careful examination of the foundations 
of human rights and engagement with its main theoreticians like Finnis, 
Nussbaum, Griffin, Rorty, Gewirth, George, or Dworkin would be more than 
adequate when approaching this issue, but this paper hardly provides space for 
that. To support the claim that human rights, including the right to health, lack 
the foundation, I draw on the words of Jacques Maritain who participated in the 
process of drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recounted 
“how a visitor at one meeting expressed astonishment that champions of 
violently opposed ideologies had been able to agree on a list of fundamental 
rights. The man was told: ‘Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no 
one asks us why’”70. Jonathan Wolff comes to a similar conclusion when he 
realizes that human rights were agreed on the basis of overlapping consensus, 
not on the basis of their foundations71 72. They were instituted so that utilitarian 
reasons wouldn’t be able to override them and because actions now called 
violations of human rights were occurring and the signing parties felt that a 
mechanism enabling them to act in the interest of an individual against his state 
should be put in place. 
The human right to health was instituted as creating three obligations 
for governments: to respect, protect, and fulfil, that is not to discriminate 
individuals realizing their right to health, to protect them from interference of 
third parties while realizing this right, and provide the necessary measures 
enabling its realization73 74. 
The institution of the human right to health was made on the basis of 
intuitions humans share. We feel that no one should be dying because of 
starvation, cold, or lack of treatment, because of being in a disadvantaged 
position. Although I claimed that there is no known universal basis for the right 
to health, I will now address the intuitions they proceed from to see if a plausible 
defence for the public provision of healthcare can be made on their basis. 
                                                 
70
  A. Kohen, In Defense of Human Rights, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, p. 151. 
71
  This makes them vulnerable to change. 
72
  J. Wolff, The Human Right to Health, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2012. 
73
  A.E. Yamin, “Beyond Compassion: The Central Role of Accountability in Applying a 
Human Rights Framework to Health”, Health and Human Rights, vol. 10, no. 2, 2008, p. 
8. 
74
  J. Wolff, The Human Right…cit., pp. 43-44. 
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Everyone desires to be healthy but unfortunately the fulfilment of this 
desire is not attainable for all. Individuals are born with genetic impairments 
and predisposed to specific illnesses; throughout their lives, they fall into 
illnesses; suffer permanent injuries; engage in risky and unhealthy activities. 
Equality in health is thus unattainable, at least with the current stage of 
medicine. What is even more troubling is that while individuals are culpable for 
some of their disadvantages, a number of these disadvantages can be attributed 
to their parents, society, environment they were born and brought up in, bad 
nourishment, genetic dispositions, bad luck, lack of resources, bad climate, and 
many more. Only a small portion of them can be influenced by the individual 
itself. An intuition which many share is that it is unfair that people should suffer 
on the basis of luck, without being culpable for their disadvantage. In his reply 
to Buchanan75, Daniels addresses this intuition drawing upon the idea that 
issues, which put us in disadvantage vis-a-vis others, should be dealt with. This 
idea, nevertheless, presents a number of difficulties76. I will mention three: 
defining disadvantage, the cost of rectification, and the discerning problem. 
Firstly, even minor pain is a disadvantage, but it isn’t plausible to 
rectify every bruise we get from brushing against a bush. There is a grade in 
disadvantages. Also, what is a disadvantage varies from society to society. For a 
fashion model in the USA, a freckle might be a serious disadvantage while for a 
housewife in Somalia that would hardly be the case. 
Secondly, to try to rectify the disadvantages Somalis have in relation to 
USA is economically unrealistic. But even if we tried to rectify disadvantages 
Somalis have in relation to their wealthiest compatriots, the idea would remain 
unrealistic. Moreover, some disadvantages are not rectifiable. 
Thirdly, it is difficult to determine if an individual is culpable for his 
disadvantage. In most cases, determining culpability would entail a violation of 
professional discreetness and the trust between the doctor and the patient77. 
Moreover, it is unclear how to measure the role smoking, overeating, 
insufficient engagement in sports, stress, and other play. 
But culpability in disadvantage can’t be the only criteria of determining 
provision of healthcare. It seems harsh for a decent and civilised society to let 
people die on the streets because of their foolishness. Nevertheless, it seems 
plausible that a distinction needs to be drawn between those who are culpable 
and inculpable for their disadvantage78. While Ramsey believes that in cases of 
                                                 
75
  N. Daniels, “Fair Equality of Opportunity and Decent Minimums: A Reply to Buchanan”, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1, 1985, p. 109. 
76
  J. Wolff, A. De-Shalit, Disadvantage, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 34. 
77
  The doctor is the most probable institution to decide who is culpable, but such a decision 
would bring distrust to the doctor-patient relationship. 
78
  It is easier to defend helping someone who was born with a dysfunctional liver than 
helping someone who lost it because of alcoholism. 
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scarcity79 personal or social worth shouldn’t play a role in determining who gets 
treated and advocates either a lottery, or a “first-come, first-served” scheme80, I 
argue that the random choice brings significant accountability issues. The well 
known ethical problem of an alcoholic requesting a second liver transplant 
remains to be an issue. Should he have priority over someone who hasn’t had a 
transplant yet or isn’t culpable for the failure of his liver? The possibility of 
moving “culpables” down the list in the queue for transplants would be a very 
slippery slope, because they could be moved down until they die. Nevertheless, 
we feel that those who are disadvantaged due to bad luck shouldn’t be 
disadvantaged even more by those who are culpable for their disadvantage. 
A significant problem of disadvantage is that “not only is unhealthy 
behaviour statistically more likely among people who are poor, but also that 
people with lower socioeconomic status on average have inferior health”81. 
Moreover, if not helped, people are likely to remain in a disadvantaged state82. 
That is one reason why Daniels’s advocacy of healthcare rests on a Rawlsian 
approach of equality of opportunity83. Good health enables individuals to 
develop their capacities, brings them a plurality of opportunities, allows them to 
be more efficient and thus contribute to the economy and the enhancement of 
society. It is thus in the interest of the society as a whole to aid those who are 
disadvantaged84.  
Heretofore I showed that a rights approach doesn’t provide a defence of 
universal provision of healthcare and that an egalitarian effort to rectify 
disadvantages and achieve equality has challenging obstacles which I at present 
times consider to be insurmountable. Nevertheless, on the basis of my previous 
fair play argument I claim that some form of universal provision of healthcare 
would be to the benefit of all and thus should be put into practice. Not only 
because it’s a shared intuition85 and because it is to the mutual benefit of all, but 
also because it is a way of making the worse off better off. 
                                                 
79
  For example, one liver but two patients in need of transplant. 
80
  P. Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Exploration in Medical Ethics, New Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 2002, p. 256. 
81
  A. W. Cappelen, O.F. Norheim, “Responsibility in Health Care: A Liberal Egalitarian”, 
Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 31, no. 8, 2005, p. 479. 
82
  T. Rice, “Individual Autonomy and State Involvement in Health Care”, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, vol. 27, no. 2, 2001, p. 242. 
83
  N. Daniels, “Equity of Access to Health Care: Some Conceptual and Ethical Issues”, 
Health and Society, vol. 60, no. 1, 1982, p. 72. 
84
  Nevertheless, efficiency can’t be the only argument for healthcare. Argumentation of this 
nature would be a slippery slope as those who are incurable could be considered 
unsuitable for life in a society. Such an approach is not only inhuman to those who don’t 
contribute to the society; it is also very harmful to the society itself as it brings uncertainty 
and destroys the mutual ties between individuals. 
85
  However, individualists, cynics and others often don’t share them. 
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Using Rawls’s difference principle86 has a number of problems, like the 
“serious difficulty [...] [of] how to define the least fortunate group”87. But 
despite the problems my limited application of this adapted difference principle 
presents, I consider it to be useful in setting basic criteria of universal provision 
of healthcare. 
The difference principle not only ensures that the least well off benefit 
from taxation, but this benefiting also benefits those who are better off, because 
it incentivises the less fortunate to preserve the system they benefit from. 
Moreover it enables avoidance of further disadvantages proceeding from other 
disadvantages. I thus conclude that the fact that the rich get richer is not a 
problem as long as the worse off benefit from it. And the fact they do benefit is 
obvious, because the endowments of those who are better off enable them to 
bring prosperity, innovation, progress, etc., which the disadvantaged benefit 
from. Thus while capitalism does embrace inequalities, it brings prosperity at 
the same time. 
Therefore, while for ensuring “that individuals who are at a 
disadvantage have an equal probability of attaining good health, it is necessary 
to redistribute resources from those who have been more fortunate”88, we need 
to keep redistribution within limits in order not to lose the incentives brought by 
private property and enterprise. To over redistribute in pursuit of equality would 
destroy the biggest advantages of capitalism – making all parties better off by 
enabling progress. 
 
 
The Extent of Healthcare Provision 
 
In the previous sections I advocated the idea that the difference 
principle forms a plausible basis for provision of healthcare. Nevertheless, on its 
own, the difference principle is insufficient. To claim that the mere fact that 
someone is better off because he benefits from my profit is not satisfactory, as it 
would enable us to claim that it’s all right when someone is dying on the street, 
because thanks to me the street he’s dying on is a fine street he could walk on 
when he was still alive. It’s implausible to be satisfied with such a minimal 
extent of making someone better off. 
A more substantial safety net is necessary and arguably the wealthy 
would accept it because not only will it be there for them in case they need it (to 
which they presumably wouldn’t give much importance), but primarily it’s 
                                                 
86
  J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, 
p. 53. 
87
  Ibidem, p. 53. 
88
  T. Rice, “Individual Autonomy…cit.", p. 243. 
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implausible to believe that the more disadvantaged members would satisfy 
themselves with preserving a system which would enable them to die on a fine street. 
If they didn’t, the advantage of redistribution for the wealthy would be lost. 
Nevertheless, it is a challenging task to establish what is the adequate 
level of making one better off, in the case of this, paper the level of healthcare 
that should be available to everyone within a polity. In the developed parts of 
the world, an organ transplant is considered to be a standard procedure while in 
undeveloped parts the peak of healthcare is availability of penicillin. In some 
parts of the world, the best way of supplying healthcare can be by building 
wells, sanitising urban areas, or clearing them of mines. In other parts of the 
world – by educating the population in basic hygiene, training nurses, setting up 
basic care centres. In other parts of the world – by improving safety, training 
policemen and sending social workers to problematic areas. In other parts of the 
world – by subsidising expensive operations or improving mental health 
through plastic surgery. 
While some of the examples mentioned above differ from a 
conventional understanding of healthcare, it must be understood that the aim of 
healthcare is to enable and enhance the health of people. In a number of places 
this will be best done by advancing some of the points I have outlined above89. 
Healthcare sometimes enables survival through supplying clean water, 
sometimes reduces pain by injecting morphium, sometimes makes life more 
pleasurable through plastic surgery and sometimes acts in a different way. It’s 
not a trivial task to distinguish what of this should fall under healthcare, because 
if everything that improves the quality of life did, then chocolate would have to 
make part of a doctor’s kit as well. 
It is thus inevitable to recognise that every polity has an imaginary array 
of services which are considered to form a minimum for a decent life in the 
polity. This is what I claim to be the array of services which should be supplied 
to those who aren’t able to reach them on their own90. In the same way that fire 
trucks don’t extinguish fires only on houses of those who paid for the service 
but on every house and the costs are paid for by everyone. This is to the mutual 
benefit of all, as houses which paid for the service could be endangered by 
unextinguished flames from houses which didn’t pay for the service. An 
analogical logic is applicable to ill people who, remaining untreated, could 
infect those who paid for treatment. 
The array of services every polity should provide should be flexible and 
be updated frequently so that it corresponds to progress or regress. To be over 
dependent on a fixed list would be mistaken – tuberculosis has disappeared in 
                                                 
89
  J. Wolff, The Human Right…cit., pp. 40-44. 
90
  These should be paid for through taxation because it would be too difficult to control who 
is unable to pay for them. 
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some parts of the world whereas in others it is still taking its toll and has 
reappeared in others. 
Pursuing equality rather than gradually increasing the minimum along 
with economic progress would be mistaken as well. If equal healthcare was to 
be provided to all, we would have to set a standard and ensure that everyone 
gets it. If we set it too high, for example providing everyone with all the 
healthcare the current stage of medicine offers, supplying it would become 
economically impossible. And if we set it too low, those who would and could 
have better healthcare wouldn’t be able to obtain it, although they would be 
willing to pay extra for it. And it seems ridiculous to prevent someone from 
getting a hip transplant because it is above the standard, but permit him to buy a 
third yacht91. To prevent the wealthy from buying better goods, healthcare in 
this case, through enforcing equality, would destroy incentives for creating 
wealth. That would leave everyone worse off. 
Although it may seem unfair that someone has access to better 
healthcare, destroying this possibility would be of disadvantage to everyone, 
mostly to the worse off. Capitalism isn’t necessarily fair, because luck is a 
significant variable. Someone may come up with a great idea and make a 
million dollars out of it, although he didn’t labour for it as someone who didn’t 
get the idea. But capitalism makes everyone better off, and that is why it should 
be pursued. 
As I have claimed, the array of services differs by polities and is subject to 
time. It would thus be unreasonable to aim to provide their suitable list. I expect that 
in most of the Anglo-Saxon world, the array of services would span provision 
of healthcare for children, because they are the most vulnerable to disadvantage. 
Thus prenatal gynaecologist care, birth in a proper facility with the assistance of 
a qualified personnel, basic vaccination, child dentist, regular checks with the 
paediatrician and other would be included. Similarly, the treatment of illnesses, 
basic transplants, operations, basic palliative care and other services would be 
included. Subject to economic progress, I expect that in a few years or decades 
issues like aesthetic surgery, a wider array of psychiatric services, or sight 
correcting surgeries will be included in the universal provision as well. 
 
 
Economical Limits of Healthcare 
 
Universal provision of healthcare necessarily requires state involvement 
and regulation. This regulation involving redistribution, nevertheless, needs to 
balance two motivations: the provision of healthcare to those who wouldn’t 
                                                 
91
  A.E. Buchanan, “The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care”, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, vol. 13, no. 1, 1984, pp. 55-78. 
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attain it on their own in a purely capitalist system and the preservation of the 
advantages that the capitalist system provides92. 
Universal provision of healthcare as any activity has its costs, including 
those which may not be so apparent, like opportunity costs93 or slower 
economic growth, a consequence of the fact that those who are entitled to free 
healthcare because of their low incomes won’t improve their earnings or will 
contribute to the grey economy94. 
The cost of healthcare is a crucial issue which I demonstrate by the 
following argument. If a year’s insurance cost one dollar, everyone or nearly 
everyone would buy it. But services can’t be supplied under production costs95 
and so a number of individuals won’t pay for insurance because it’s too 
expensive96. Some don’t buy it because they don’t have the resources for it, 
some because they prefer to buy other goods. Some don't believe they'll need a 
doctor and rely on luck or past experience97. Others prefer alternative methods 
of healthcare, which are not covered by insurance, like homeopathies, or have 
doctor in their family or among their friends who will cure them for free. Some 
religious groups don’t accept public treatment and rely on doctors within their 
community. Others simply won't bother to arrange insurance because they 
consider their time or energy to be an opportunity cost which is not worthwhile 
spending on the issue. 
And then there are those who would be made worse off if they were to 
pay for health insurance. As Ferguson and Leistikow claim,  
 
 “In the context of realistic health insurance and health care systems, it is 
rational for some people not to want health insurance. Poor people may be the most 
likely to be hurt by existing and proposed health insurance  plans, particularly universal 
health insurance. Advocates of universal health insurance [...] perpetuate common 
 misconceptions [...] that universal coverage of all illness is possible at reasonable cost. 
They omit the loss of social  welfare resulting from health insurance's inherent 
distortion of relative prices and the inevitable consequences: attempts to limit the 
intolerable costs of the resulting excessive demand through price controls and reduced 
coverage”98. 
                                                 
92
  When speaking of the state involvement and capitalism, I necessarily have to adopt a very 
broad understanding of both terms. 
93
  Money spent on healthcare cannot be spent on anything else. 
94
  W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, Thomson South-
Western, Mason. Ohio, 2002, p. 16. 
95
  Sometimes they are through state subsidy, which is nevertheless ineffective, because it 
means that financial resources are being taken from another area, which not only distorts 
the market but also has additional transaction costs. 
96
  I don’t take into account minor reasons like lack of information, ideological reasons, 
laziness, etc. 
97
  Perhaps they haven’t gone to the doctor for the past ten years. 
98
  R. Ferguson, D. Leistikow, “Problems with Health Insurance”, Financial Analysts 
Journal, vol. 56, no. 6, 2000, p. 28. 
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By providing universal healthcare, all these particular decisions of 
individuals regarding paying for healthcare are lost. Although some of these 
decisions may be distorted by the pursuit of short-term goals99, the information 
they contain should be taken into account, because people’s decisions not to 
insure themselves shows that they don’t consider the costs to be corresponding 
to the benefits they provide100. If they are therefore coerced to carry the costs of 
healthcare through taxation, inefficiency is preserved. 
As is apparent from the preceding paragraphs of this section, I will now 
outline some of the main detriments of universal provision of healthcare as well 
as of leaving its provision to the free market. My aim isn’t to provide a 
comprehensive plan of how to provide healthcare but to show that a functional 
healthcare system minimising negatives and maximising positives will be an 
assortment of capitalist logic and the motivation to provide healthcare to all. 
A significant advantage of universal provision of healthcare is that it 
enables the state to evade free-riding and supply healthcare to those who 
wouldn’t otherwise get it. But this advantage comes with the costs of 
unnecessary consumption, which is an inevitable consequence of indiscriminate 
provision of public goods101. Inefficiency of such provision is inevitable 
because those who wouldn’t consume goods if they had to pay for them do 
consume them when they’re supplied to them. If every visit to a doctor required 
even a minimal payment, not only would the number of visits drop, such an 
arrangement would provide incentives for people to live healthily as it would 
benefit those who don’t smoke, drink excessively, don’t engage in risky sports, 
exercise regularly, etc. The common objection that poor individuals wouldn’t 
attend the doctor because of the payment is not plausible102, as the only reaction 
would be that individuals would reason more carefully when it is beneficial for 
them to go to the doctor and when not to. I compare this to car insurance. If we 
have a minor accident with a small dent, we also reason if it isn’t better for us to 
repair it privately rather than let the insurance company pay for it, which would 
involve paying a higher insurance next year. 
In relation to efficiency, a state run healthcare system also inevitably 
faces the information problem outlined by Hayek103, which I touched upon in 
the preceding section. No system can allocate all the relevant information for 
generating optimal decisions because of their amount and thus the more people 
that participate in their forming through the market, the closer to optimal will 
                                                 
99
  D. Hume, A Treatise…cit., pp. 534-536. 
100
  T.R. De Gregori, “Market Morality: Robert Nozick and the Question of Economic 
Justice”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 38, no. 1, 1979, p. 23. 
101
  W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory…cit., pp. 669-678. 
102
  Given that the obligatory payment is a small and affordable amount. 
103
  F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, The American Economic Review, 
vol. 35, no. 4, 1945, p. 519. 
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the decisions made be. Moreover, letting individuals make the decisions brings 
them more content and engagement in the enterprise, which is favourable to 
progress104. 
Nevertheless, the information problem is based on two major 
assumptions. The first one is that people in general have the capacity to make 
good decisions, that their chances of making the right decision are overall 
higher than to make bad decisions and that if this first condition is met, that they 
will choose this right decision rather than the wrong one105. But the first 
assumption fails in situations which require expertise. Moreover, a satisfactory 
quantity of consumption is also necessary. If we buy a spoiled loaf of bread, we 
not only recognise its bad quality, we can also punish the supplier by going to a 
different supermarket the next day. But we usually need expertise to recognise a 
bad doctor, as we can assign his failure to cure us to other causes than his 
inability106. Moreover, we usually don’t visit the doctor often enough to punish 
him for bad treatment and thus motivate him to provide us with better care. 
Furthermore, unlike with buying bread, in healthcare we have limited 
possibilities of shopping around as its cost is much higher and the supply is 
more limited. 
Some areas simply need to be regulated by the state. For example, only 
the state can, under normal circumstances, ensure the participation of all or 
nearly all individuals in enterprises where such participation is essential for the 
success of the enterprise, like sanitation or vaccination. Moreover Friedman 
concedes that in some areas, like care for people with psychiatric disorders, the 
state has to be paternalistic107. Moreover while the market is effective in 
distributing resources, this says nothing about the fact if it’s doing so in an 
ethical way. The fact that people choose what they see as best for them doesn’t 
say much about the morality of such choices. A solitary Nozickian principle of 
justice in transfer connecting consent to morality, advocated in the Wilt 
Chamberlain example108, is not satisfactory109. 
To pursue the above illustrated point, I argue that although economic 
efficiency and innovation, where free markets serve well, are desirable in many 
areas, in others, like education, the military or healthcare not only aren’t they 
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  T. Rice, “Individual Autonomy…cit.”, pp. 240-241. 
105
  For selfish reasons, for example. 
106
  For the same reason the state has a place in giving out licences to qualified doctors. While 
unlicensed doctors shouldn’t be prevented from giving care because some people prefer 
alternative medicine, it should be clear which doctors are institutionally recognised, for 
patients lack the necessary expertise. 
107
  M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, 
p. 33. 
108
  R. Nozick, Anarchy…cit., pp. 161-163. 
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  T.R. De Gregori, “Market Morality…cit.”, p. 18. 
TOMÁŠ VÁŇA 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 4  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
692
primary, they could be damaging110. Where stability and accessibility to all is 
more important than efficiency and innovation, where free markets can’t ensure 
evading a fall in quality due to pursuit of economic profit, where there is lack of 
information for the consumer and little or no competition preventing him from 
altering the provider of the service, or where there are little incentives for the 
provider to improve his services, state provision is preferable111, as it reduces 
the danger of economising the area, which could end in supplying worse or 
restricted services112. 
Free markets also don’t deal with those who don’t have the means to 
pay for their treatment and healthcare113. Even in functioning insurance systems 
the state needs to ensure that those who can’t afford it or are rejected by 
insurance companies due to their uninsurability because of chronic illnesses, 
expensive treatment, high risk, or other will not be deprived of healthcare. The 
Dutch system can serve as an inspiration for creating a system of managed 
competition integrating free market logic with regulation enabling universal 
provision of healthcare. A system in which every insurance company has to pay 
a certain amount into a risk fund covering the costs of treatment of uninsurable 
patients, and in which the amount paid or taken from the fund depends on how 
many of these they insure, enables insurance companies to make a risk 
calculation and prediction if it is beneficial for them to either insure some of the 
uninsurable and get money from the risk fund, or don’t insure them but pay to 
the risk fund a considerable amount of money114 115. 
The role of the state is also indispensable in providing healthcare in 
unprofitable medical or geographical areas, where due to low profit because of 
high cost of treatment or low density of population, a free market system 
wouldn’t provide healthcare. 
As I stated at the beginning of this final section, I don’t intend to engage 
in specific policies, not least because they need to be adapted to specific 
polities. By outlining some of the difficulties which markets as well as state 
provision present, I tried to illustrate that there needs to be a balance between a 
universal provision of healthcare and capitalism to ensure that the benefits of 
                                                 
110
  This doesn’t include areas like medical research. 
111
  Naturally, some efficiency is necessary; it’s the grade and priority of efficiency what the 
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  A. Shleifer, “State versus Private Ownership”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
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114
  A.C. Enthoven, P.M.M. Wynand, “Going Dutch ‒ Managed-Competition Health 
Insurance in the Netherlands”, The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 357, 
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115
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both are not lost and negatives of both are minimised. I thus argue that a system 
where through taxation, the state contracts private competing suppliers to 
supply services which the market doesn’t satisfactorily supply on its own, is a 
plausible compromise accepting redistribution and regulation but at the same 
time preserving the benefits of capitalism. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
In the presented paper, I provided one approach to defending taxation. I 
did so by showing the deficiencies in Nozick’s defence of private property and 
inviolable rights and thus demonstrating that we can’t claim absolute 
entitlement to private property. I also showed that Cohen’s refusal of private 
property by claiming that it is theft is not plausible and that his advocacy of 
common ownership presents serious difficulties. On the basis of these 
contrasting approaches to private property, I concluded that while private 
property can’t be absolute, to reject it isn’t plausible either, and showed that the 
benefits it brings can provide its strong defence. 
By further pursuing Taylor’s view that the society has priority over an 
individual, I reject an individualistic approach to the human person and claimed 
in unity with my argumentation regarding private property that taxation can be 
justified if it provides public goods which all the members of a polity benefit 
from. I defended this argument on the basis of the fair play theory where I 
showed that because taxation benefits every member of a polity, it would be 
unreasonable for an individual not to intend to benefit from this joint enterprise 
and refusing taxation would thus be unacceptable free riding. 
After defending taxation I demonstrated that universal provision of 
healthcare meets the criteria of being a public good benefiting all and thus 
claimed that it can be justifiably provided through taxation. I addressed the 
rights approach as well as the disadvantage and egalitarian arguments. Although 
I conceded that they provide a plausible argumentation for healthcare, the 
former lacks a fundamental theoretical basis and draws on overlapping 
consensus, while the latter presents serious economic difficulties. I thus showed 
that an adaptation of the difference principle is a more plausible approach of 
defending universal provision of healthcare, as it benefits all members of a 
polity. 
In the final sections of this paper I addressed the extent to which 
healthcare should be provided and argued that it needs to be adapted to the 
particular circumstances of every polity. I also outlined some economical 
difficulties that universal provision of healthcare presents and on their basis 
advocated that a compromise between capitalism and egalitarian motivation 
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regarding healthcare must be made so that advantages of both may be preserved 
and their negatives minimised. 
I believe that by the argumentation presented in this paper I succeeded 
in defending the position that, in principle, taxation is justifiable. 
 
 
 
 
